The Cardiff Agreement of this month has made clear the Celtic nations’ priority of a future in the European Union (EU). Bolstered by devolution conversations and frustrations of post-Brexit economic decay, this ambition offers hope of something greater. But how feasible is this promise?
The pivot to Brussels presents an important reframing for the independence movements, towards progressive internationalism rather than isolationist withdrawal. The EU can offer 450 million consumers, renewed freedom of movement, and labour to offset Scotland and Wales’ ageing demographics.
Nonetheless, beneath the joint rhetoric lies some divergence.
For Scotland, the ambition is viable. With 62% having voted Remain in 2016, Scots Law, an independent civil service, and a strong revenue base in energy and finance, Holyrood meets many Copenhagen Criteria. Yet, satisfying Article 49 requires establishing a central bank, currency controls, and strict deficit limits, all while managing a new hard regulatory border with England, its largest trading partner.
In Wales, the situation is quite different. After voting Leave in 2016, the political narrative is not as simple. Wales shares a legal jurisdiction with England, lacks an independent monetary machinery and has the UK’s lowest GVA per capita. Building state infrastructure from nothing to meet EU convergence rules would require a long and intense development plan, all of which would have to occur without reliance on internal fiscal transfers.
If full EU membership proves too costly or creates unacceptable Anglo-Celtic trade barriers, both nations face difficult fallbacks. They either become EFTA/EEA states like Norway, which is seemingly unviable, or operate as isolated micro-economies cut off from both Westminster subsidies and EU funds.
It’s difficult; the promise of EU re-entry is the essential political crutch keeping the independence movement alive in Scotland and Northern Ireland– it gives it international legitimacy and appeals to young voters. However, the hard economic realities of Article 49 risk turning the EU promise into the Celtic’s own version of Brexit, where an oversimplified campaign slogan disguises severe trade-offs. Especially for Wales.
This conversation probes England. By watching Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland organise a move toward the European single market, an economically stagnant England under Burnham may eventually be forced to reckon with its own national future. This conclusion may be that the only way to save the UK’s internal market is for England itself to start rebuilding ties with Brussels.
This is a pivotal time. While the Celtic nations make this statement, Ursula von der Leyen is proposing “associate membership” for Canada within the EU, stoking the narrative that the institution is flexible enough to accommodate creative alignments. Thus, in an era defined by geopolitical conflict and economic strain, nations and institutions alike are scrambling for survival, and cooperation remains their strongest tool. Whether through full integration, flexible associate statuses, or unprecedented cross-border alliances, the imperative to adapt will likely force pragmatic compromises, perhaps creating unexpected and inventive alignments on the global stage. This could be one of them.
“File:Rue Notre Dame, Beaune – Pickwicks pub – Welsh, French, Irish and Scottish flags (35466123622).jpg” by Elliott Brown from Birmingham, United Kingdom is licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0.
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Scotland and Wales Want Back into Europe. What Would It Take?
The Cardiff Agreement of this month has made clear the Celtic nations’ priority of a future in the European Union (EU). Bolstered by devolution conversations and frustrations of post-Brexit economic decay, this ambition offers hope of something greater. But how feasible is this promise?
The pivot to Brussels presents an important reframing for the independence movements, towards progressive internationalism rather than isolationist withdrawal. The EU can offer 450 million consumers, renewed freedom of movement, and labour to offset Scotland and Wales’ ageing demographics.
Nonetheless, beneath the joint rhetoric lies some divergence.
For Scotland, the ambition is viable. With 62% having voted Remain in 2016, Scots Law, an independent civil service, and a strong revenue base in energy and finance, Holyrood meets many Copenhagen Criteria. Yet, satisfying Article 49 requires establishing a central bank, currency controls, and strict deficit limits, all while managing a new hard regulatory border with England, its largest trading partner.
In Wales, the situation is quite different. After voting Leave in 2016, the political narrative is not as simple. Wales shares a legal jurisdiction with England, lacks an independent monetary machinery and has the UK’s lowest GVA per capita. Building state infrastructure from nothing to meet EU convergence rules would require a long and intense development plan, all of which would have to occur without reliance on internal fiscal transfers.
If full EU membership proves too costly or creates unacceptable Anglo-Celtic trade barriers, both nations face difficult fallbacks. They either become EFTA/EEA states like Norway, which is seemingly unviable, or operate as isolated micro-economies cut off from both Westminster subsidies and EU funds.
It’s difficult; the promise of EU re-entry is the essential political crutch keeping the independence movement alive in Scotland and Northern Ireland– it gives it international legitimacy and appeals to young voters. However, the hard economic realities of Article 49 risk turning the EU promise into the Celtic’s own version of Brexit, where an oversimplified campaign slogan disguises severe trade-offs. Especially for Wales.
This conversation probes England. By watching Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland organise a move toward the European single market, an economically stagnant England under Burnham may eventually be forced to reckon with its own national future. This conclusion may be that the only way to save the UK’s internal market is for England itself to start rebuilding ties with Brussels.
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This is a pivotal time. While the Celtic nations make this statement, Ursula von der Leyen is proposing “associate membership” for Canada within the EU, stoking the narrative that the institution is flexible enough to accommodate creative alignments. Thus, in an era defined by geopolitical conflict and economic strain, nations and institutions alike are scrambling for survival, and cooperation remains their strongest tool. Whether through full integration, flexible associate statuses, or unprecedented cross-border alliances, the imperative to adapt will likely force pragmatic compromises, perhaps creating unexpected and inventive alignments on the global stage. This could be one of them.
“File:Rue Notre Dame, Beaune – Pickwicks pub – Welsh, French, Irish and Scottish flags (35466123622).jpg” by Elliott Brown from Birmingham, United Kingdom is licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0.
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