Lula’s win would have been impossible without his online army

The Bolsonaros have once again failed to win control over the levers of power, with Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva securing a fourth presidential term in Brazil, defeating Flavio Bolsonaro in a neck-and-neck race. How did Lula, condemned to a near-certain defeat after Brazil’s first-round elections, manage to achieve a triumphant comeback opposite the right’s most charismatic leader?

Flavio Bolsonaro’s grip looked secure after his round one victory while for the 80-year old incumbent, an end to a tumultuous reign might have seemed almost certain. Ex-President Jair Bolsonaro’s comeback campaign, having planted his son-of-the-moment Flavio as his frontman, was seeming to take effect. A partnership with the televangelist Silas Malafaia had been crucial in allowing Bolsonaro to capture the fast-growing evangelical population with provocative online preachings. With social media increasingly dominated by radical Bolsonarist views it became clear that for Lula, a laid-back online strategy was no longer an option. For the self-professed “selfie-king” who proudly doesn’t own a cellphone, the backbone of Jair’s campaign was looking to be his most damning hamartia.

On the morning following his defeat, Lula’s digital Renaissance began. “Lula’s Army” was activated, a WhatsApp channel encouraging followers to repost and share call-to-arms style hashtags to bolster his online presence. His online army extracted not just keyboard warriors but actual voters from Bolsonaro’s grasp: in the space of just three weeks the channel grew to over 10.8m members, with mirrored impacts on Lula’s voter base. A narrow loss to Bolsonaro on October 4th spun itself into victory by over 4m votes last Sunday. The somewhat hasty decision to step up and activate “Lula’s Army” between the elections proved critical in capturing latent supporters susceptible to being enticed by Bolsonaro’s online presence into swinging right.

Social media has long been exploited to promote digital propaganda, most effectively by the far-right. Trump famously shared AI-generated footage of a luxury development plan to transform Gaza, piloted by himself, into the “Riviera of the Middle East.” In a similar vein, Germany’s far-right Alternative fur Deutschland (AfD) appointed Maximilian Krah as the party’s semi-satirical social media icon in 2023. Like Trump, Krah, who had been embroiled in controversy due to his defence of the SS, targeted young audiences on social media with his provocative messages, telling boys “don’t watch porn!” Meanwhile, far-right content dominates 58 per cent of all political TikToks in France, Romania, and Finland.

Lula’s U-turn exposes the potency of social media as a new vessel for political messaging, a vessel which the left has grossly overlooked. Challenging Bolsonaro’s monopoly on digital politics was vital in securing his re-election. Short-form content proves the perfect portal for the outlandish: it immediately hooks the most susceptible, and those who aren’t sold can simply scroll on. With the ghostly preachings of Krah still lingering in today’s AfD, and Brazil marginally saved from a reign of Trump-infused terror, it is clear political battles can no longer be played out only in the real world. The virtual space has proven itself increasingly fertile ground for far-right radicalism to lay its roots. It is past time for the left to take up their digital arms and assume their rightful position within it.

Image “Anuncio Rio2016“ by Ricardo Stuckert is licensed under CC BY 3.0 BR